Expectations, communications, and monetary policy by Sandra Pianalto
out what policymakers are doing, and
then decide how much to save, what
kinds of assets to acquire, which skills to
learn, and so on. These decisions, in turn,
affect the economy’s future growth path. 
I think that the new emphasis on consis-
tent behavior puts an even higher pre-
mium on disclosure. In the simple
worlds of economic models, it is rela-
tively easy to specify an appropriate pol-
icy rule for setting the federal funds rate.
But in the real world, this is a much
harder task. It is nearly impossible to
specify in advance all of the situations
that might arise and how the central
bank should react to them. However, 
I do think we get closer to the ideal
environment by being clear about our
objectives, by responding consistently
and predictably to economic conditions,
and by communicating promptly and
clearly about our actions, especially when
unusual situations present themselves.
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Since early 1994, the FOMC has
taken many steps toward increasing
the amount of information it conveys
to the public about its actions. San-
dra Pianalto, a Federal Reserve
Bank president and FOMC partici-
pant, outlines the evolution of
increasing transparency in FOMC
communications and suggests a way
that the process can go further still.
This Commentaryis taken from
Pianalto’s speech to the Money 
Marketeers in New York City on
April 19, 2005.
My remarks will center on expecta-
tions, communications, and monetary
policy. Specifically, I would like to 
share with you my thinking on how the
Federal Open Market Committee has
“learned to talk”—in other words, 
how the FOMC has evolved from being
regarded as secretive to now being
viewed as more transparent. My 
discussion will emphasize three points.
First, consistent behavior matters. 
Second, the FOMC’s communications—
how we talk about policy goals and
actions—have played an important role
in enhancing the effectiveness of mone-
tary policy.
Third, we should consider taking addi-
tional steps toward greater transparency
when it seems likely that they can fur-
ther enhance the effectiveness of mone-
tary policy. 
Please note that the views I express
today are mine alone. I do not presume
to speak for any of my colleagues in the
Federal Reserve System.
n  Consistent Behavior Matters 
Let me begin, then, with why I think
consistent behavior matters. One of the
most important insights of modern
macroeconomics is rational expecta-
tions. Economists have always recog-
nized that expectations guide the behav-
ior of individuals, businesses, and
policymakers. But central bankers owe a
great deal to the academics who led the
rational expectations revolution of the
1970s and 1980s. One of their key
insights is that although people are
bound to make mistakes in assessing
policies, policymakers themselves can-
not systematically exploit these errors.
Specifically, in the case of monetary pol-
icy, people will recognize when central
bankers have incentives to try to trade a
little inflation for extra short-run output.
For example, if people believe that the
central bank is willing to boost eco-
nomic activity in the short run by creat-
ing greater-than-expected inflation, then
they will come to expect the highest
inflation rate that the central bank will
tolerate. This is clearly a worse outcome
for everyone compared with a situation
in which people expect—and the central
bank delivers—price stability. Establish-
ing a credible commitment to price sta-
bility, and conducting monetary policy
consistent with that commitment, solves
this problem.   
Many of you will recognize this line of
thinking as one that began with Finn
Kydland and Edward Prescott, and was
later enriched by other economists. Kyd-
land and Prescott were awarded the 2004
Nobel Prize in economics partly because
of this research. 
As a result of this rational expectations
work, and the research it prompted, acad-
emic economists began to encourage 
policymakers to follow predictable rules
of behavior. The new theories empha-
sized the importance of consistent behav-
ior and created a whole new context for
thinking about central bank disclosure.
The burden of proof for maintaining
secrecy began to shift. Economists began
to challenge policymakers to provide
more information, and for good reason.
People spend resources trying to figuren  The FOMC’s 
Communications 
At this point, I would like to talk more
specifically about FOMC communica-
tions. Although the FOMC has political
independence to implement monetary
policy, ultimately it is a public institu-
tion. Accordingly, the FOMC provides
information to the public through the
minutes of its meetings, the semi-annual
monetary policy report to Congress, reg-
ular appearances by the Chairman and
other Board members before congres-
sional committees and, with a lag, the
release of full meeting transcripts. All of
these communications help the FOMC
fulfill its obligation to be responsible to
the Congress and the public. 
As important as these public communi-
cations are, I want to focus now on the
role of communications in the imple-
mentation of monetary policy. The
1990s, in my estimation, will be remem-
bered quite favorably as the decade
when the FOMC first learned how to
talk. Although the process is ongoing, 
I believe that the Committee’s commu-
nications have made for better monetary
policy. Through its communications, the
Committee has provided the public with
a more complete explanation of its
policy decisions.
I think about this progress in terms of
two distinct types of information. One
category is historical—the rationale that
the FOMC provides for decisions it has
already taken. Another category is more
forward-looking—the opinions that the
Committee holds about the future state
of the economy and its intentions
regarding likely policy actions. These
intentions are steeped in probability and
subject to revision. 
The transcripts of the FOMC meetings
in the mid-1990s reveal that the Com-
mittee’s early discussions about
enhanced communications centered on
whether, and how, to reveal information
about the decisions it had already made.
Late in the decade, the discussions
broadened to include communications
about the Committee’s intentions. Let’s
take a closer look at these two types of
information, beginning with the histori-
cal information.
A general argument for secrecy during
the 1980s and early 1990s was that 
markets might not react appropriately
to the disclosure of policy information.
Just think about this. Before 1994, the
FOMC did not reveal its policy deci-
sions immediately. The prevailing mind-
set was that markets were better off not
knowing for certain what everybody
seemed to know—the FOMC’s opera-
tional objective. 
It is useful to recall the precise situation
in February 1994. The federal funds rate
hike at that FOMC meeting followed a
long period—15 months, to be exact—of
no change in the funds rate target. The
transcripts of that meeting contain com-
ments suggesting that disclosure of the
policy decision would be desirable
because it could enhance the public’s
understanding of the change. The tran-
script also shows that there were mixed
opinions as to whether it would be a
good idea to adopt such announcements
as standard practice. 
When the Committee announced its pol-
icy decision that February, it also chose
to convey that announcing the decision
should be regarded as a temporary
departure from its customary practice.
Clearly, many FOMC members were
still concerned about introducing volatil-
ity in financial markets if announce-
ments were made as a matter of course.
The initial announcement did not even
refer to the funds rate directly. The lan-
guage was still couched in terms of
increasing “the degree of pressure on
reserve positions.” 
To me, the FOMC learning how to talk is
in some sense like a person learning how
to walk through a dark room without
knowing where the furniture is. You
move very slowly, feeling your way.
Sometimes you discover you’re a bit off
course. You may stumble, but you learn
to adapt and move to your destination. 
From my perspective, changes in Com-
mittee communications since February
1994 look like steps in the process of
refining and becoming more comfortable
with greater transparency. Many of you
remember these steps: In February 1995,
the Committee agreed to announce every
change in the stance of monetary policy
on the day of the decision. A few months
later, in July 1995, the Committee agreed
to replace the phrase describing reserve
pressures with an explicit number for the
funds rate target.
Let me now turn to the treatment of for-
ward-looking information. More
recently, steps toward greater trans-
parency have been made to condition
expectations about what might happen
at future meetings. The “policy tilt” lan-
guage first appeared in May 1999. The
basic idea was to convey a major shift in
the Committee’s sentiments about
potential changes in its federal funds
rate target at some point in the future,
even if no actual change in policy
occurred at the meeting that produced
the statement. Unfortunately, markets
seemed confused by the language and
by subsequent comments from FOMC
participants. This reaction caused the
Committee to work out the kinks in the
language, which resulted in the “balance
of risks” statement that the Committee
adopted in February 2000. The con-
struction of the balance of risks state-
ment became more flexible in March
2003, and the statement remains in use
today. So, in terms of my analogy, I
might say that the stumble in the dark
led to some careful course corrections. 
You are certainly familiar with the “con-
siderable period” language first adopted
after the August 2003 meeting. That lan-
guage was designed to address a partic-
ular problem at a particular point in
time. Specifically, as we all know, the
language was aimed at being perfectly
transparent about the Committee’s
desire to avoid unwelcome disinflation.
As that problem passed, the language
was gradually modified, evolving into
the “measured pace” phrase that the
FOMC has used since May of last year.  
I think that, on balance, innovations in
communications have improved the
effectiveness of monetary policy and thus
have enhanced economic welfare. Stud-
ies show that since the 1980s, U.S. finan-
cial markets and private-sector forecast-
ers have been able to better forecast the
federal funds rate out several months and
have been less surprised by FOMC
announcements. Research at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland shows that
market participants expect the Commit-
tee to respond predictably to information
that might have a bearing on inflation
and employment.
Do markets understand our behavior
because we are more predictable or
because we communicate better? I sus-
pect that both forces are at work. As
they say, talk is cheap, and I am not sug-
gesting that better communications are
of any value without actions that back
up the words. A key implication of recent research is
that the public understands what infor-
mation is likely to guide the FOMC’s
policy actions, and that the FOMC and
financial markets react to that informa-
tion in a consistent way. Our communi-
cations have evolved over time in ways
that I believe contribute to this under-
standing. 
n  Should We Take Additional
Steps to Enhance FOMC
Transparency?
We have truly come a long way. But do
we need to go further? That brings me
to my third point—I think that we
should consider taking additional steps
in the direction of greater transparency
when it seems likely that they can fur-
ther enhance the effectiveness of mone-
tary policy. 
What we have learned about the central
role that transparency can play has
given rise today to the notion of a
“communication policy” as an integral
part of monetary policy itself. By “com-
munication policy,” I mean a strategy
for reinforcing the traditional policy
tools, such as open market operations,
with printed and spoken words that can
help the public make better decisions.
As you now know from the just-
released minutes of the March 22
FOMC meeting, there are some on the
Committee who think that the phrase
“measured pace” has outlived its useful-
ness. In my view, this language has pro-
vided useful guidance in the limited
time we have used it, but there is a risk
that at some point the Committee will
take an action that the public regards as
contrary to what is implied by the lan-
guage. To me, this risk suggests that the
Committee should provide this type 
of guidance only when it is highly con-
fident in the course of its near-term pol-
icy actions and when it perceives the
cost of being misunderstood as excep-
tionally great.
I can tell you from my experience that
although the Committee is inclined
toward greater transparency, changes in
its practices generally have been driven
by real circumstances that confront 
policymakers in real time. As the
FOMC pursues price stability and max-
imum sustainable growth, changes in
our communications—what to say, how
to say it, and when to say it—should be
designed foremost to improve the effec-
tiveness of monetary policy. 
So far, I have talked only about greater
transparency in our operating proce-
dures. In the final portion of my
remarks, I want to talk about what some
regard as the “next frontier”: Increasing
transparency about the FOMC’s infla-
tion objective. 
As you know, the FOMC discussed the
pros and cons of establishing an explicit
numerical inflation objective at the Feb-
ruary meeting. I think that being more
explicit about our inflation objective
could help us to be successful in main-
taining price stability, but my expecta-
tions are modest. I do not regard an
explicit numerical price objective as 
a panacea.
We might gain some additional credibil-
ity with the public by simply being
clearer than we are today and, at the
same time, greater clarity might impose
some extra self-discipline when we
really need it. Let me make my own
contribution to the cause. My view is
that the rate of inflation should average
about 1
1/2percent, as measured by the
Personal Consumption Expenditure
price index, over periods of about three
to five years. 
Inflation is certain to vary in the short
run, even when we achieve the objective
over time. So putting a range around
that long-run objective makes sense to
me. My personal tolerance zone is a 
1 percentage point spread above and
below my 1
1/2percent inflation objec-
tive. I don’t view this necessarily as a
policy-triggering boundary, but when
inflation falls outside that range, I would
feel more obligated to explain why I
regarded that situation as acceptable. 
These are my personal guideposts. I
generally support the idea of a Commit-
tee objective and range. I say generally
because I think it is not particularly use-
ful to offer a blanket endorsement for a
proposal that is not yet on the table. Fur-
thermore, I’m sure many of you have
been keeping score and know that some
of my colleagues are in favor of more
formal numerical objectives, but others
are not. This does not trouble me,
because I do not think it is necessary to
jump to formal targeting in one leap.
However, I think it would be useful to
take a step in that direction. 
The FOMC’s semi-annual economic
projections provide a mechanism for
taking that step. As you know, twice a
year the FOMC now provides the pub-
lic with economic projections for the
current year and the year ahead. The
step I have in mind would have the
FOMC provide an additional three- to
five-year projection for inflation. This
would be based on the participants’
working definitions of price stability
and policies that support them. 
The ranges and central tendencies of
these extended projections would be
made public, perhaps in an expanded
discussion in the Monetary Policy
Report. I would not be surprised to dis-
cover that the extended three- to five-
year inflation projections of the individ-
ual FOMC participants converge to a
fairly narrow range. This convergence
could provide the foundation for a more
formal inflation objective at some point
in the future. 
Taking this step ought to be regarded
as a logical extension of our current
practice. In fact, I regard it as entirely
consistent with the gradual approach
the Committee has taken over the years
to improve communications with the
public.
n  Concluding Remarks
I think we can all agree that the FOMC
behaves more consistently and commu-
nicates more effectively to the public
about its decisions today than it did in
years past. Although more information
does not automatically equal useful
information, I believe that greater trans-
parency has helped to improve the
effectiveness of monetary policy. Going
forward, I expect the Committee to
adopt new communication practices as
needed. After all, necessity is still the
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